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PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM
Mark Elder
May 16,1988
In 1979, A W DePorte made the argument that the new European 
system that had evolved out of the cold war was fundamentally stable, and it 
now stands quite independently of its cold war origins 1 The stability 
derives from the fact that the new system serves the mimmum interests of 
most states, especially the most powerful ones By stability, DePorte means 
that the system helped to ensure the survival of the member states and 
maintain peace DePorte argued, Those who think they foresee power 
changes [on the scale of the 1950s] may fairly claim to foresee also major shifts 
in the European system, others should not 2
The stability of the political equilibrium in its current structural form is 
due to the fact that it restrains the maximum objectives, while serving at least 
the mimmum interests, of the major actors The primary powers have been 
forced to abandon hope of achieving their maximum revisionist goals The 
US rollback policy, the German desire for reunification, the Eastern European 
desire for independence from Soviet domination, and the Soviet ambitions 
to dominate Western Europe can no longer be seriously considered The 
current power configuration enables the essential interests of the major 
powers to be met The German problem is solved for everybody The 
commumst threat and the capitalist threat have been neutralized since 
neither side can gam a power advantage over the other The Soviets have 
gained the means and the rationale for dominance over Eastern Europe 
Eastern Europe has enjoyed relative peace, and the Eastern European 
commumst regimes can maintain their tenure in power Poland gams 
protection against German revisionism on the border question Western 
Europe gams peace and the ability to pass on a large share of its defense costs 
to the United States The Umted States gams a stable balance of power m 
Europe, and an umbrella of peace that shelters an international economy 
open to US trade and capital, enabling most countries to abandon the 
economic nationalism required by the self-help system
The political equilibrium is maintained by six essential structural 
characteristics The first is a balance of power between the Umted States and 
the Soviet Union, and the overall East-West balance Second, each 
superpower is more powerful than any European state or potential 
combination of states Third, the states in each half of Europe were linked 
to their protecting or hegemonic superpower by a thickening web of security, 
political, and economic ties Fourth, the two subsystems were asymmetrical 
The Western subsystem was based on more or less voluntary commitments, 
while the Eastern subsystem was based on Soviet power The division of 
Germany is the fifth characteristic 3 The sixth implicit characteristic is that 
there is no extra-European state on the honzon with the power to alter these 
balances in the manner in which the United States transformed the European 
state system beginning with its involvement m the two world wars
2The thesis of this paper is that the power shifts that have occurred since 
1979 have not been the kind that are likely to upset the political equilibrium 
Moreover, the major sources of change that are acting on tne system seem to 
be reinforcing, or at least not disrupting, that stability
The Thesis Challenged
1 From the Left
This thesis has been challenged in recent years from a number of 
directions On the left, Sherle Schwennmger and Jerry Sanders argue that 
events have rendered the original transatlantic bargain nonsensical 4 They 
argue that Europe and Japan are perfectly capable of defending themselves, 
while opposing many US policy positions on issues such as Vietnam, arms 
control, the Middle East, Central America, mterest rates, terrorism, Libya, and 
economic sanctions against the Soviet Union 5 The central threat, they imply, 
comes from the arms race instigated by the Reagan defense buildup, while 
the political and economic realities in Europe have made Soviet aggression 
unthinkable 6 The main reason is that Moscow's ambitious plans to 
increase the GNP by 4 percent a year until the year 2000 require not only a 
stable and peaceful international environment, but also Western 
developmental assistance 7 They argue that an aggressive NATO 
modernization of its conventional forces could reinforce the position of those 
m the Kremlin who have argued for their own high-tech conventional 
strategy 8 Their recommendations include a reduction of the US defense 
burden without increasing Europe s defense spending (it would be 
provocative and reduce European demand for US exports), encouragement of 
Soviet economic development, and integration into the world economy 9
2 From the Right
Henry Kissinger proclaims a crisis of confidence m the Atlantic 
alliance 10 He argues that the fear of decoupling, combined with Soviet 
conventional superiority, will make it probable that Europe will seek new 
directions in the years ahead Some countries will be tempted to maneuver 
between East and West others will go in the opposite direction and seek to 
build up their own nuclear forces In either case, the old pattem of American 
tutelage will end 11 Kissinger feels that a policy of denuclearization would 
open the floodgates of neutralism 12
3As Michael Lucas notes, Some NATO officials worry that the 
Germans will see Gorbachev as an excuse to opt out of the East-West 
conflict, as one former US official put it 13 Lucas ates Sam Nunn as saying, 
One NATO road leads backward down a slippery slope to European 
denuclearization, American disengagement, and Soviet domination The 
other NATO road leads forward to the solid ground of solidarity, stability, and 
security 14
Stability or Change
Certainly, change is the norm rather than the exception m 
international politics, indeed DePorte notes that stability is a special case of 
change, not the natural order of things 15 The European system, now as 
always, is expenencmg pressures from a number of different directions 
These pressures, however, will not affect the stability of the system unless 
they either induce a significant change in the distribution of power, or alter 
countries perceptions of their interests The remainder of the argument will 
assess the impact of the various forces of change on each of the structural 
components of the system
The United States-Soviet Strategic Balance
The Soviet Umon achieved strategic parity with the United States in 
the late 1960s This parity was codified by the SALT process during the 1970s 
Since then, there have been perennial warnings about the erosion of the 
credibility of extended deterrence Extended deterrence, however, is still the 
declared US policy The presence of US ground troops and tactical nuclear 
weapons, moreover, would make it impossible for the United States to 
separate itself from any European conflict History has not yet invalidated 
extended deterrence Twenty years after the Soviet achievement of nuclear 
parity with the Umted States, Western Europe still has democratic 
institutions and market economies The United States has maintained its 
presence on the continent The Soviet Union has not invaded Western 
Europe Nuclear panty between the superpowers is likely to continue in the 
foreseeable future, and a new strategic arms agreement seems possible This 
pillar of stability is likely to remain intact
The Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(INF) Treaty does not undermine this stability Treaty cnücs argue that the
4real reason the Pershing 2 missiles were placed m Europe was to enhance 
extended deterrence, not to remove the Soviet SS-20s 16 Kissinger explains 
that with intermediate-range US weapons in Europe, the Soviets could not 
threaten Europe selectively, any nuclear attack and any successful 
conventional attack would trigger an American counterblow from European 
installations The Soviets would have to calculate—even m the case of a 
conventional attack—that we would use our missiles if they used even 
conventional weapons in Europe, that in turn would trigger our strategic 
forces 17 The zero option in the INF treaty therefore weakens extended 
deterrence Jonathan Dean rightly points out that this is based on the 
assumption that only visible land-based deployment of American nuclear 
weapons in Europe would really convince Soviet leaders that they risked 
strategic nuclear war if they decided to attack Western Europe 18 Kissinger s 
next line concedes that other kinds of nuclear weapons would do just as well 
as the ones banned by the INF In that sense, the US offer [to deploy] 
intermediate-range missiles was a selfless act If we needed intermediate- 
range weapons for purely American purposes at all—which is doubtful—we 
could have deployed them more easily and with much less controversy on 
ships 19 Dean adds that the US decision to respond to a Soviet attack would 
not depend on whether the missiles were land-based or not, but would 
depend on other factors such as the balance at the time and the President s 
personality 20 More seriously, it is difficult to see the original coupling lmk 
m Kissinger s argument It is not clear how the use of US INF missiles in 
Europe would automatically lead to the use of US strategic missiles as long as 
the Soviets abstained from attacking the United States directly Indeed, INF 
missiles could themselves lead to decoupling, since the United States could 
use the INF missiles first while delaying the response of using the strategic 
missiles In any event, the Hudson Institute study of INF cites Kenneth 
Adleman, who notes that after the treaty, the West would still retain over 
4,000 nuclear warheads for a variety of US and allied delivery vehicles— 
nuclear capable aircraft, including F -llls  with greater range than the Pershing 
II, short-range missiles, and nuclear artillery, several hundred Sea Launched 
Ballistic Missile (SLBM) reentry vehicles would also remain dedicated to 
NATO British and French systems would remain and modernization could 
proceed as planned 21
The Conventional Balance
Many would argue that the East-West balance in conventional 
weapons seems to be less stable than the strategic balance Despite the talk of 
INF treaty, glasnost, perestroika, and the new thinking in Soviet foreign 
policy, there is no evidence that the Soviets have now begun to lower their 
defense budgets or otherwise unilaterally reduce their own force levels or 
those of their Warsaw Pact allies
5Meanwhile, the four largest NATO powers are facing domestic political 
pressures and economic pressures to unilaterally reduce defense 
expenditures US annual trade and government budget deficits are still over 
$100 billion Political support for defense spending is weakemng It is 
inevitable that NATO spending will be targeted for cuts since over half of the 
defense budget is attributable to NATO United States calls for more allied 
burden sharing are a part of this trend Britain, despite its anemic economic 
condition, already shoulders the largest financial burden in NATO, aside 
from the Umted States Its defense budget compnses 5 5 percent of its GNP 
(1984) 22 Its defense budget is the third- or fourth-largest [in the world] 
(depending upon how one measures China s total), its navy the fourth- 
largest, and its airforce the fourth-largest 23 It has been argued that Britain s 
Trident program will ' at best, inhibit a major British contribution to 
enhancing NATO s non-nuclear provision, and at worst, could impel a 
reduction m the country s current contribution to the Alliance s 
conventional capabilities 24 Prospects for increases m the French budget for 
conventional forces are almost as bad Given the delicate state of the French 
economy, the 4 2 percent of the GNP it spends on defense cannot be 
increased by very much 25 It will be further constrained by the nuclear 
modernization program, along with the fact that 30 percent of the French 
defense budget is spent on nuclear arms 26 In West Germany, the 
government desires to keep defense spending to 3 5 or 4 percent of the GNP 27
West Germany, moreover, is suffering from adverse demographic 
trends that will greatly reduce its pool of eligible draftees Record and Rivkm 
argue that there is virtually no possibility that the Bundeswehr can maintain 
its present strength [495,000] beyond the early 1990s By 1995 the 
Bundeswehr could shrivel to a force two-thirds its present strength (ì e , to 
335,000) 28 Ministry of Defense officials say the Bundeswehr is almost 
certain to decline to a force of 400,000-450,000 men within the next decade 29
There are four mam reasons why these trends are not likely to lead to 
instability First, the Soviets do not have the capacity to take advantage of this 
by increasing their own defense spending in the absence of cost-reducing arms 
control agreements William Safire cites recently revised CIA estimates of 
Soviet growth rates which indicate that Soviet growth has been much lower 
than previously estimated The implication is that Moscow s arms budget, 
not including the costs of empire, is closer to 25 percent of the GNP 30
Second, NATO nuclear deterrence will remain intact Extended 
deterrence is still declared US policy The British and French governments 
are proceeding on schedule with their nuclear modernization programs, 
which have solid public support—at least in France The conventional 
balance has always been supported by the nuclear balance
6Third, NATO weapons have become much more powerful since the 
late 1970s NATO has introduced 10,000 new mam battle tanks with laser 
range finders and ballistic computers since 1980 while half of the Soviet tank 
force, the aging T-54/55s, continue to grow older than their current 40 years 31 
NATO has advanced F-15 and F-16 aircraft along with the naval F-14 and F-18 
The new stealth fighter is now beginning to be introduced into the US 
arsenals NATO may have fewer men, but its forces are not likely to be 
significantly weaker as a result The reliability question of Eastern European 
forces and the upset in the Soviet demographic balance between Russians and 
Asians will offset, to some degree, the impending reductions in Western 
manpower Moreover, birthrates in Asia are not down, and this may require 
the Soviets to shift more forces to the Asian fronts m the future
The fourth reason is the difficulty of reversing Gorbachev s new 
approach in foreign policy Indeed, a major factor m the pressure on Western 
European governments to reduce defense budgets is the perception of a 
receding Soviet threat As long as this perception is accurate, however, and if 
economic reconstruction is really motivated by economic and consumer 
concerns, stagnation or reductions in Western defense capabilities should 
pose little threat to continued stability A return to intimidation would only 
result m continued restrictions on Soviet access to Western technology
The serious danger that could theoretically emerge would be 
reductions in defense budgets leading to a reversal of the Soviet policy of 
detente and a return to a policy of intimidation, whether as a result of 
Gorbachev changing course or as a result of his fall from power brought about 
by KGB and bureaucratic fears of domestic instability There is strong 
evidence indicating that such a policy reversal is not likely First, the Soviet 
program calling for a 4 percent annual growth rate up to the next century, will 
require a period of relaxed international tensions and access to Western 
technology A return to intimidation would jeopardize both Moreover, a 
recent CIA report showed Soviet economic growth m 1987 to be stagnant at 
0 5 percent The CIA predicted that the Soviet GNP would grow at an average 
of less than 2 percent per year for the next two years 32 Continuing weakness 
in the Soviet economy greatly reduces Soviet ability to increase defense 
spending and avoid consumer unrest Returning to intimidation would only 
stimulate an arms race the Soviets could not afford Second, Gorbachev 
wants to prevent, or at least postpone, the development and deployment of 
the West s technologically advanced weapons system, of which SDI is at the 
top of the list, but that also includes a number of conventional weapons as 
well 33 Intimidation would reverse the peaceful Soviet image and dash all 
hopes of stopping deployment of new high technology weapons
If the Soviet Union did return to a policy of intimidation, the Western 
European reaction would probably be one of resistance rather than 
neutralism, as some are concerned it might be It is unwise to assume that
7countries do not learn from history or adapt to circumstances There are 
significant conservative political factions in Western Europe that have taken 
the lead against Soviet intimidation m the past and would undoubtedly do so 
m the future These are the Europeans whom Kissinger and other 
conservatives cite when they wish to document European fears regarding 
such problems as decoupling and credibility
Western Europe has a long history of resistance to aggression, even in 
difficult times Europe backed the US policy of aiding the resistance m 
Afghanistan and voted for the Afghanistan resolution m the UN General 
Assembly The Berlin blockade was strongly resisted NATO followed 
through on the Dual Track decision to deploy INF missiles in response to the 
Soviet introduction of SS-20s Britain and France responded to Imperial 
German aggression in World War I The critics all point to the example of 
the appeasement of Hitler, citing it as a demonstration of the weak backbone 
of the West This explanation is highly misleading If they had had the 
power, Britain and France probably would have resisted Hitler earlier The 
French forces were set up for a defensive war, an offensive action would have 
overextended French forces lacking the logistic capability for an offensive war 
They felt stronger on the military defensive World War I pushed Bntain 
literally to the edge of bankruptcy, the Treasury warned that another war 
would be an unmitigated financial disaster The Chiefs of Staff, m any case, 
indicated that British unpreparedness was such that war should not be risked 
before spring 1939, at the earliest34 Even the Soviet Union s internal 
weakness was such that it signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 The 
Soviet objective was to avoid war, if possible, and if a war was unavoidable, to 
ensure that the burden fell on the West first35 The West would have resisted 
Hitler if it had had the power, but it didn t With the NATO alliance and the 
United States, Western Europe does have the power to reduce any 
intimidation by the Soviet Union which, in all likelihood, would only 
strengthen NATO
The New Thinking and Soviet Foreign Policy
Some authorities argue that the Soviet leopard has not changed its 
spots Dimitri Simes claims that Gorbachev is merely displaying unusual 
tactical flexibility m the pursuit of traditional Soviet objectives 36 Among 
these objectives, according to Simes, is maintaining control over Eastern 
Europe, preventing, whenever possible, the emergence of unfriendly 
governments on the Soviet periphery, sponsoring Third World clients, 
aggressively seeking to undermine and/or replace US geopolitical influence, 
and developmg a military capability sufficient both to assure the USSR s 
ability to deal with any conceivable coalition of enemies and to project force 
on a global scale 37 While these objectives demand careful attention on the
8part of the West, they are hardly of the apocalyptic dimension portrayed by 
Caspar Weinberger, who still argues that ' world domination is the never- 
changing Soviet goal 38 According to Simes, most Soviet people are 
intensely patriotic and cherish the Soviet great power image Gorbachev s 
own devotion to Soviet greatness is not in doubt On the contrary, he has 
often emphasized that one of the principal reasons behind his call for far- 
reaching economic reform is the need to maintain and enhance the Soviet 
role in international affairs 39 While the Soviets have begun to display a 
greater flexibility m arms control talks and areas outside of Europe, they have 
not taken any concrete steps to revise their force posture to a more defensive 
stance Soviet internal debates on strategic doctrine have not yet produced 
tangible alterations in force structures They are careful not to allow their 
flexibility to be interpreted as a sign of weakness
There is considerable evidence, however, that Gorbachev is acting to 
relax international tensions and reallocate foreign policy and defense costs in 
order to give higher priority to domestic and economic reforms The 
previous policy of intimidation seems to be giving way to a policy of 
conciliation If it proves enduring, the new thinking' in Soviet foreign 
policy will continue to be an important factor in continued European stability
The INF treaty and the impending withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan are the most dramatic signs of the Soviet abandonment of their 
policy of intimidation The Soviets abandoned or compromised on the last- 
minute obstacles that threatened to delay Senate consideration of the treaty 
George Schultz concluded that 'we have reached a completely satisfactory 
agreement on all of those issues 40
The Soviets have followed a policy of conciliation on regional issues as 
well, which were until now considered to be the mam sticking point 
hindering better East-West relations The Soviets commenced their 
withdrawal from Afghanistan on schedule This withdrawal, moreover, will 
pave the way for better relations with Chma and its ally, Pakistan 
Gorbachev s Vladivostock speech in July 1986, made a significant concession 
on the border dispute with China 41 The Angolan government has accepted 
the principle of total Cuban withdrawal, and Soviet officials have hinted 
that they would not block progress toward a settlement 42 Gareth Porter is of 
the opinion that the Soviets have become more active diplomatically m 
promoting a negotiated settlement on the Cambodian question, and that 
Hanoi clearly cannot count on indefinite Soviet support for its occupation of 
Cambodia 43 The Soviets have exercised restraint m the Persian Gulf, even 
hinting that they may, under certain circumstances, be willing to go along 
with sanctions against Iran They have begun, seriously, to explore the 
possibility of improved relations with Israel Galla Golan notes Gorbachev s 
declaration ’ that the absence of diplomatic relations between the Soviet 
Umon and Israel cannot be considered normal 44 Soviet unwillingness to
9accommodate Ortega s demands for assistance probably reflects a desire to 
avoid complicating relations with the Umted States as much as the need to 
avoid the high economic costs that would be entailed The Soviets seem 
anxious to avoid more multibillion dollar Cubas or Vietnams The New 
York Times reports that the Soviet Umon has taken measures recently to 
reduce its support for the Cuban economy 45
There have also been reports that the Soviet Union has been making 
fundamental changes m its military doctrine, from a preemptive strike to 
reasonable sufficiency or defense sufficiency According to Raymond 
Garthoff and a Department of Defense official, most experts doubt the Soviet 
strategic about-face is a ploy to lull the West mto complacency 46 Soviet 
Defense Minister Yazov was even willing to discuss doctrine dunng his 
unprecedented official visit, in Washington, with US Defense Secretary 
Carluca Carlucci s evaluation of these talks was cautiously optimistic 
While his talks with Yazov 'produced no concrete proof of any change in 
doctrine, Carlucci believes that simply holding a meeting set an important 
precedent The fact that ' Soviet officials are at least talking intently about 
such a change is a sign of hope 47
Certainly the INF treaty and prospective START agreements enhance 
the importance of conventional weapons, possibly giving the Soviets a 
military advantage Henry Rowan and Charles Wolf, Jr point out that the 
Soviets may use any financial savings gamed from arms control to 
concentrate on other types of weapons They argue that resources may be 
transferred instead to command, control, and communications, 
militarization of space, airlift capability, defense research, or aid to the 
empire 48 Yet these arguments neglect two important considerations First, 
savings out of current budgets would be negligible The systems are already 
built More money might even be needed for reductions (to destroy the 
missiles) and verification Once built, nuclear weapons are relatively cheap 
Any savings would have to come from future programs Second, to the 
extent that there are savings, the Umted States would be equally able to take 
advantage of them A START agreement could easily limit the number of 
expensive new strategic systems, such as B-l and Stealth Bombers, new 
ICBMs, or more Trident submarines, that the Umted States must acquire To 
the extent that this happens, funds would be freed for use on conventional 
weapons An agreement on short-range nuclear weapons could free Bntish 
and French funds currently earmarked for nuclear modernization, easing 
pressure on conventional weapons budgets The Soviets could have little 
interest in the technological race in conventional arms that would ensue 
Even Dimitri Simes allows that an intensified technological arms race 
would occupy thousands of Soviet scientists and engineers whose work is 
vital for economic modernization 49 This would seem to point to a tangible 
Soviet interest m a conventional arms control agreement
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Whether the new Soviet flexibility is motivated by primarily economic 
concerns or military concerns relating the need to keep up with the West, the 
issue of Soviet motivation will have little impact on the question of stability 
If the Soviet Union is motivated primarily by economic concerns, then 
stability is almost assured The Soviets would not be likely to invade Eastern 
Europe, and the pace of European integration would continue and possibly be 
expanded to include the East Small changes m the conventional balance 
would not make much difference
Yet, even given an unreformed, ever aggressive Soviet Union, 
domestic and economic reforms will still be necessary This is acknowledged 
even by those hawks who ceaselessly warn about the need for ever higher 
defense budgets to combat the ever increasing Soviet threat Former National 
Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski declares that the Soviet Union has 
clearly failed as an economic rival [and it] does not represent a challenge 
to American global primacy as such 50 Moreover, 'over the next two or 
three decades the Soviet Union will fade even further 51 Even Caspar 
Weinberger can reluctantly acknowledge that Gorbachev most likely 
does want to buy some time from the West m order to stimulate his country s 
moribund economy 52
The genie is now out of the bottle, reform in the Soviet Umon is now 
underway To stop it now, to reverse the process before it could be given a 
fair chance, would be a bitter disappointment to many Historically, the 
Soviets have proved competent at handling the dangers that attend a dashing 
of rising expectations, sudi as Hungary m 1956 and Czechoslovakia m 1968, 
although the Shah in neighboring Iran was less successful Yet, any uprising, 
with its attendant political and economic dislocations following the 
subsequent repression, would gravely weaken the Soviet Union and hinder 
its ability to conduct an effective foreign policy, although probably not to the 
extent of 1917
There are other reasons why it does not matter if the Soviets are 
pursuing economic reforms only to enhance their ability to compete with the 
West First, the reforms might not work anyway, and the Soviet threat would 
be still further reduced by its continued relative economic decline Second, 
any savings obtained by the Soviets from their military budgets will be 
matched or exceeded by savings from the military budgets of the Western 
alliance If both sides use the savings productively, the prospect is for Soviets 
to do little more than hold their own in terms of relative economic standing 
m comparison with the West If or when the Soviets decided to reverse their 
tactics again towards a more aggressive strategy, the West would be able to 
draw on increased resources to meet the renewed threat
Eastern Europe
It is difficult to foresee the impact that Gorbachev s policies of glasnost 
and perestroïka will have on Eastern Europe The leaders of East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria are all m their mid 70s Ceausceau is 
69 The current leaders in Eastern Europe are unenthusiastic about the 
application of glasnost and perestroika in their own countries The danger of 
domestic instability from these policies is much greater in Eastern Europe 
than in the Soviet Union Charles Gati asserts that any significant efforts at 
reform would only generate demands for more—more democracy, more 
independence, more consumer goods, higher living standards 53 Eastern 
European leaders also worry that Gorbachev may not be able successfully to 
implement his reforms in the Soviet Union Nor are they sanguine about his 
prospects for staying m power 54 Even if the Eastern European leaders were 
interested in reforms, they do not have a Brezhnev or Chernenko, as 
Gorbachev does, on whom to blame past problems 55
Yet, the test will come within the next few years as the old regimes are 
replaced The process is already beginning m Hungary Prime Minister 
Karoly Grosz, regarded as favoring more radical changes, has announced a 
special conference to be held on May 20,1988, on the subject of Kadar s 
position m the government According to the New York Times, the 
conference 'is also expected to look at major questions such as redefining the 
leading role of the Communist Party, and reducing its role in the day-to-day 
running of the country, particularly in economic matters 56 The Soviet 
Union will be forced to confront a new generation of leaders in Eastern 
Europe within a few years
There are essentially two possible outcomes The first is Soviet 
acquiescence in whatever course Eastern Europe decides to take, even if it 
means growing political liberalization and increased economic ties with the 
West, along with at least some Eastern European sensibility to Soviet 
concerns This outcome would maintain or enhance European stability, and 
the slowly deteriorating conventional balance would be of small consequence
The other possibility is that the Soviets will feel forced to intervene 
militarily, whether to prevent too much independence and movement 
towards the West or to put down a rebellion against an Eastern European 
government that tried to reform too slowly This prospect is just as likely as 
the first Simes believes that the Brezhnev Doctrine is very much a part of 
Gorbachev s policy He quotes from Gorbachev s speech at the Polish party 
congress in June 1986
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socialism now manifests itself as an international reality, as 
an alliance of states closely linked by political, economic, cultural 
and defense interests To threaten the socialist system, to try to 
undermine it from the outside and wrench a country away from 
the socialist community means to encroach not only on the will 
of the people, but also on the entire postwar arrangement and, m 
the final analysis, on peace 57
One observer worries that Soviet military repression might drift into an 
unplanned conflict, with local skirmishes escalating into a major war 58
This outcome is highly unlikely, since neither superpower would have 
the interest or the ability to begin an all-out East-West conflict m that event 
The West has a long history of nonintervention m the penodic Soviet 
invasions of its satellites It would be very difficult for the Umted States to act 
without its allies, and there would be little prospect for an agreement on 
military intervention NATO, moreover, does not have the supplies or the 
bridging and pipelaying equipment needed for an invasion of Eastern Europe 
It is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would attempt to undertake a 
preemptive attack During an invasion of Eastern Europe, the Soviets would 
have to watch their fellow Warsaw Pact armies very carefully If other 
Eastern European governments were not supporting the action against the 
offending country, it is even more unlikely they would support an invasion 
of the West In this situation, the Soviets could definitely not rely on their 
Warsaw Pact allies in an attack on the West The Soviets would be hopelessly 
overextended if, deprived of their allies, they tried to fight Eastern and 
Western Europe simultaneously It would be uncharacteristic of the Soviets 
to take risks on that scale An invasion of Western Europe would probably 
create internal divisions within the Soviet leadership, and it is unlikely that 
the General Secretary would nsk his position on a scheme with such a small 
chance of success The possibility of accident is equally unlikely Since the 
Cuban missile crisis, both superpowers have learned how to give the other 
side a face-saving way out when a conflict is not desired
The outcome of the recent labor turmoil in Poland demonstrates the 
interest that all parties have m preventing a violent confrontation 
According to the New York Times, the solution reached m Gdansk was a 
face-saving compromise for both sides Solidarity was free to continue its 
pressure on the authorities to follow through on commitments to economic 
change, including union pluralism The communist authorities were spared 
the international outcry that certainly would have followed a decision to end 
the strike with broken bones and bloodied heads '59 Solidarity leaders are 
careful not to destabilize the situation to such an extent that the Soviet Umon 
would be forced to intervene They do not want to undermine Gorbachev s 
authority and his policies of glasnost and perestroika The Polish 
government is equally anxious to avoid Soviet intervention, which would
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only exacerbate its lack of domestic political legitimacy It also recognizes that 
domestic stability depends on some degree of reform For its part, the Soviet 
Union is eager to avoid a situation where it would have to intervene in 
Poland A military intervention m Poland would destroy all the progress that 
the Soviet Union has made m enhancing its public image m the West The 
likely Western reaction would probably include a military buildup, which 
would be difficult for the Soviet Union to match, and restrictions on 
economic relations Soviet foreign policy would be set back twenty years by 
an intervention
Foreign Policy Distractions from Domestic Failures
One oft-ated danger is that if Soviet domestic reforms misfire and 
cause political instability, the Soviet regime might be tempted to embark on 
foreign policy adventures in order to deflect attention from domestic 
problems William Hyland worries that if Gorbachev senses that he is 
failing and struggles to survive, it could be a dangerous period for the Umted 
States as the temptation to compensate for internal failures with foreign 
policy adventures may prove irresistible 60 The fact that people who worry 
about this problem never provide any clues as to what form such an 
adventure might take, is but one indication of the improbability of its 
occurrence Restricting access to Berlin and putting missiles m Cuba have 
already been tried more than once, there would be no reason for the Soviets 
to suppose that the Western reaction would be any different another time 
around, especially since the West is much stronger than it was dunng the 
previous crises Intervention m the Middle East would be the height of folly 
The Soviets cannot but be painfully aware of American sensitivities in this 
region This is where the erstwhile accommodatiomst, Carter, drew the line 
A Democratic Congress added to the Reagan Administration s requests for 
covert funding of the Afghan guerrillas and insisted that Stinger missiles be 
provided The Democratic Congress has also refused to challenge 
Administration naval missions m the Persian Gulf On an earlier occasion, 
Henry Kissinger raised the alert status of US nuclear forces as a warning 
against Soviet intervention in the Middle Eastern
Any aggressive adventures would be attended by risks of a high degree, 
the type of risks that the Soviets have typically been loathe to take It is 
difficult to generalize, but historically, the Soviets have not engaged m 
questionable foreign policy adventures dunng periods of internal weakness 
The Soviets have probably not forgotten that it was the attempt by the Czars 
to bolster their regime by entering World War I, that enabled the Bolsheviks 
to gam power The internal turmoil after the Revolution in 1917 was 
followed by the Brest-Litovsk treaty, authorized by Lenin m order to
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consolidate his domestic control Stalin was desperately afraid of war with 
Hitler, which he feared could lead to the destruction of his regime 61 He took 
all possible precautions to avoid war When Hitler s invasion finally came, 
Stalin was reluctant even to order resistance until he was convinced 
Hitler had launched an all-out attack 62 After the War, Stalin did pursue a 
policy of isolation and hostility towards the West,63 but military initiatives, 
such as Iran, were more of a probing nature, and imposition of control over 
Eastern Europe was seen as a strategic necessity Yugoslavia was the dnvmg 
force behind the Greek communists, and Stalin s refusal to be dragged into an 
East-West conflict over Tito’s ambitions over Trieste and China s ambitions 
over Formosa, were major factors in the Soviet-Yugoslav and Sino-Soviet 
splits The only real exception was the Cuban Missile Crisis, which illustrates 
the penalty for failure Khruschev was ousted and his policy condemned as a 
harebrained scheme
Current non-Soviet examples further illustrate the difficulty of this 
concept The penalty for failure m these adventures is the near certainty of 
the downfall of the regime, as the Argentine Generals learned after the 
Falklands Reagan s Grenada adventure succeeded only because it was a 
situation of killing an ant with a sledgehammer The Soviets may have a 
sledgehammer, but ants are m short supply
Any adventure of an aggressive character could easily rum everything 
the Soviets have gamed through detente, gams that were pursued under a 
policy initiated by the conservative Brezhnev regime Gorbachev could 
definitely improve his domestic position by foreign policy adventures, but 
not of the aggressive variety More likely candidates for adventures would be 
peace overtures in Korea or Indochina, or dramatic arms control proposals m 
START, short-range nuclear missiles, or conventional arms in Europe
Finally, if Gorbachev s new policies did lead to domestic political 
instability, there would be no reason to expect a foreign policy adventure to 
solve the problem A foreign policy victory, whether of the aggressive or 
accommodative variety, might placate disgruntled party leaders, but for 
domestic unrest it could do no more than buy time or temporarily deflect 
international attention from the problem As soon as the euphoria over a 
foreign policy victory subsided, the domestic instability problem would 
resurface In this situation, the only solution that would maintain the power 
of the Communist party, as presently constituted, would be a return to 
Stalinist methods for which the apparatus still exists To embark on an 
aggressive foreign policy adventure during a period of repression of 





DePorte argues that a united Western Europe would constitute a major 
structural change in the European system, the fundamental bipolarity would 
be ended 64 While true, the important issue is what the impact of greater 
Western European unity on the stability of the European system Historically, 
economic integration has been much more successful than efforts at political 
integration, and it is likely that this pattern will continue There are two 
possible sources of pressure, however, that could give political integration the 
urgency it has not had until now These would be a US decision to force 
burden sharing on the European members of NATO, or right wing worries 
about the credibility of extended deterrence Much would depend on whether 
greater unity was a result of cooperation with the United States or of clumsy 
US diplomacy
If unity resulted from US clumsiness at a time of economic dislocation, 
there would be a danger that Western Europe would increasingly resort to 
heightened economic nationalism This is not very likely, however, even in 
this extreme case European interests are adequately served by the 
international economic system, as presently constituted, there would be no 
guarantee that other arrangements, especially a trade war with the United 
States, would bring any improvement Indeed, the United States represents 
fully one-third of the world s industrial markets 65 According to Donald 
Straszheim, president of Merrill Lynch Economics, basically anybody m any 
industry has to be a player m the Umted States if they want to be a big player 
in the world 66 Moreover, large transnational economic institutions, such as 
multinational corporations and banks, have a vested interest in the current 
system, and would strongly oppose a return to European economic 
nationalism
The only real potential danger is that a more united Europe, less 
dependent on the United States for its security, would challenge US policies 
m international economic institutions, such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), with increased regularity and vigor One 
source of contention could be an increase in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) or 
the reallocation of IMF quotas This could become increasingly important 
now that the United States is a debtor nation Now, the stick of burden
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sharing is always an implicit threat against excessive European actions against 
US economic interests, if the stick is used once, its power becomes negligible
The most significant result of greater unity would be that the 
Europeans would have to take responsibility for their actions, they would no 
longer be able to play off the superpowers off against each other 
Consequently, greater European umty and burden sharing would probably 
not lead to a divergence of interests on arms control As currently 
constituted, the British and French governments are intent on pursuing their 
nuclear modernization programs, and would likely insist that conventional 
arms talks be given priority over further nuclear arms talks The United 
States even now supports the British and French position on nuclear arms, 
there is no reason why this would change with greater European unity 
Additionally, greater umty would enable Europe to achieve a greater degree of 
efficiency m military procurement and strategy
The most likely outcome is for a gradual, not precipitous, move 
towards umty Any burden sharing would likely be gradual Nobody is 
suggesting that all US troops be withdrawn at once Extended deterrence 
remains declared US policy
2 On Fragmentation
The right wing sectors of opinion tend to fear that decoupling, 
excessive pressures for burden sharing, and the alleged Soviet siren song will 
lead to fragmentation and neutralism, resulting m the long-sought Soviet 
goal of elimination of US influence from Europe One observer worries that 
by fostering intra-German relations, for example, the USSR eventually could 
weaken West Germany s commitment to NATO and sow further disunity m 
Western responses to the Soviet line 67 Kissinger worries that while the 
Soviet Umon and its Eastern European allies have no conceivable interest m 
actual unification, they could discourage the Federal Republic from making 
further pro-Western moves without paying the price of actual unification by 
manipulating the slogan of German umty 68
These kinds of arguments rarely present an analysis of actual German 
opinion When Kissinger wants to criticize US policy, he defines the German 
component of European opinion as the Christian Democratic leaders 
whom he has known and who have [had] responsibility for foreign policy 
and defense for decades After a lifetime of unquestioning support for 
American policies, they find themselves adrift in an unfamiliar world in 
which American briefers parrot the slogans of their antinuclear 
adversaries 69 When Kissinger wants to highlight what he sees to be the
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dangers of US policy, European opinion becomes an ocean ready to rush 
through the floodgates of neutralism 70
There are three strands of thought within the Socialist Democratic 
Party (SDP) on security policy the anti-nuclear left led by LaFontaine, the 
center left group of Bonn security professionals, including Horst Ehmke, 
and the moderate Atlanticist group 71 Only the left wing of the SDP led by 
LaFontaine has rejected nuclear deterrence and advocated pulling out of the 
military wing of NATO 72 The center recognizes a continuing need for NATO 
and an alliance with the United States, recognizing that the US connection 
maximizes the West German bargaining position with the East 73 Horst 
Ehmke, a leader of the centrist wing of the SDP, writes that at a minimum, 
the alliance must insist that the Soviet Union forego its current offensive- 
oriented posture m Europe and restructure its forces in a more defensive 
fashion We must also insist that Moscow revise its notion of peaceful 
coexistence, as Gorbachev now seems to be doing, to disavow unequivocally 
the Marxist-Leninist tenet that Western imperialism is incapable of peace 74 
He argues for a stronger European pillar m the alliance, 75 and advocates 
greater Franco-German cooperation on security matters 76 Ehmke concludes 
by asserting the need for US cooperation if detente is to succeed, but predicts 
that if the United States hesitates, or worse, reverts to military confrontation, 
and if it continues to oppose the expansion of East-West trade, then either 
detente or the alliance will be undermined—sadly, probably both 77 The 
implied threat, the undermining of the alliance, could only mean the 
withdrawal of Germany from NATO Yet it is not clear that Ehmke could 
carry out this threat even if the SDP had power, if it required the Soviet 
Union to alter its force structures and renounce the struggle against Western 
imperialism, and also that the Soviet Umon was not willing to meet these 
conditions The Soviets would certainly not be enamored of greater French- 
German defense cooperation The rhetoric seems more an attempt to 
influence US policy than a rush through the floodgates of neutralism
Any SDP government would require an alliance with the Greens, if 
they can replace the Free Democratic Party (FDP) as the third party The first 
would be opposed by the radical faction of the Greens and the center elements 
of the SDP The attempt at such a umon could easily result in a schism in 
either the Greens or the SDP or both An alliance with the FDP would 
probably require the retention of Genscher as Foreign Minister and a foreign 
policy that would, at a minimum, require substantial material concessions 
from the Soviets before any drastic actions with respect to NATO could even 
be contemplated Szabo concludes that a Red-Green coalition is very 
unlikely to come to power in Bonn in the medium term 78 In any case, the 
SDP will not have a chance to gam power until at least the mid 1990s 79
The fact is that nobody, except the Germans, has any shred of interest m 
German umty The Soviets would never follow through on any offer of
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reunification Brzezinski is of the opinion that the Soviets have few carrots 
they can offer to West Germany since East Germany is the linchpin of Soviet 
control m Eastern Europe, something which is non-negoüable In the 
present circumstances, releasing East Germany—as the pnce of seducing West 
Germany—would deprive the Soviet Umon of its key bastion for the exerase 
of effective Soviet military and political control over Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
and Hungary 80 The other European powers would exert enormous pressure 
on the Federal Republic the moment unification became a realistic possibility, 
possibly including drastic measures to revoke its pnvileges in the EEC
The German left may be overly optimistic, but they will eventually 
become disillusioned if the Soviets do not give them what they want In the 
meantime, it is unlikely that they will take any drastic action, such as 
withdrawal from NATO or expelling US troops from their soil without 
concrete Soviet concessions
Rise of Extra-European Powers
European politics were set in balance after World War II by the 
intervention of two extra-European powers the Umted States and the Soviet 
Union In theory, this balance could be upset in the future by the 
intervention of other extra-European powers In the long run, the new 
powers of Japan, China, India, and the East Asian NICs, will certainly have 
some affect on the balance Today, India and China together possess one-third 
of the world s population A recent Census Bureau report said that by 2050, 
Nigeria and Indonesia are expected to surpass the Soviet Union and the 
United States as the third and fourth most populous nations 81 China and, 
very likely, India already possess nuclear capabilities When these countries 
become fully industrialized, they could become a real threat to Western 
dominance of international politics and economics The Soviets are surely 
aware of these trends which are undoubtedly a cause for great concern These 
trends, by themselves, might be considered sufficient justification for 
Gorbachev s economic reform program Indeed, taking the extremely long 
view, the West might well consider buttressing the Soviet Union as a 
counterweight to the Asians This, however, is premature, the danger is m 
the somewhat distant future The non-communist developed world still 
produces roughly two-thirds of the world s GNP, and the Soviet Union 
remains the biggest competitor by far None of the nsmg extra-European 




The prospects for continued European stability are good despite all of 
the pressures from various directions, because the essential interests of all of 
the actors involved are being met by the current system and the directions of 
its evolution The desire of Europeans to maintain their civilization and way 
of life is often underestimated in the Umted States, where many have a 
different view of the Soviet threat Any clear sign of a Soviet return to a 
policy of intimidation is more likely to lead to greater integration and greater 
defense efforts, not neutralism and Soviet domination The system would 
simply revert back to the old equilibrium In any case, it is clear that any 
adverse changes m the conventional balance or European orientation 
towards greater unity or neutralism will probably not occur for another four 
or five years That amount of time will be sufficient to see whether 
Gorbachev is likely to stay in power, whether his policies of reform will 
succeed, and whether the Soviets are serious about changing their force 
structure and abandomng their old strategy of intimidation If signs from the 
Soviet Union are good on these questions, the European structure is likely to 
evolve towards greater stability If the optimists are proved wrong, the 
system will, m all likelihood, revert back to its old equilibrium and not break 
down into a shooting war
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